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Background
Resource allocation in cooperative organizations can achieve long run efficiency (Chinn 
1979; Dwight Israelseni 1980; Norman Cameron 1973; Putterman 1980). Given certain 
Abstract 
Purpose: In cooperative teams (such as agricultural cooperatives), self-enforcing 
agreement plays a critical role in guaranteeing members’ work incentives when the 
monitoring from a third party is absent. In order to provide an effective sanction to 
the violators so as to maintain the agreement, two seemingly conflicting strategies are 
proposed. One is allowing the members to exit the team freely. The other is imposing a 
high exit cost to restrict members from leaving the team. The arguments behind each 
strategy are elaborated in Lin (J Comp Econ 17:504–20, 1993) and Dong and Dow (J 
Comp Econ 17:472–84, 1993), respectively. However, these strategies have never been 
tested in the same model. In fact, no formal model is presented for one of the argu-
ments. To fill this gap, we develop a model that incorporates the two arguments as two 
scenarios in a shared framework.
Methods: An agent-based model is developed to test the two competing hypoth-
eses in the theory of self-enforcing agreement. The model takes heterogeneity of 
team members (e.g., their laziness, work ability and patience to future well-being) 
into consideration, which allows us to better understand the divergence of these two 
arguments.
Results: Using the agent-based model, we conduct computational experiments for 
testing the two hypotheses. Estimation on the experiment outputs show that (1) The 
sustained discount rate is lower in exit-free cooperative teams than exit-restricted 
ones when shirking members exist, which confirms the argument of Lin (J Comp Econ 
17:504–20, 1993), and (2) The sustained discount rate is lower in exit-restricted teams 
than exit-free ones when members’ leisure preferences are not too diverse and the 
economics of scale are not too large, or when the sizes of the teams are large enough, 
which verifies the argument of Dong and Dow (J Comp Econ 17:472–84, 1993).
Conclusion: We find the two arguments essentially claim different consequences 
under different conditions of members’ characteristics and team size. Our study 
demonstrates agent-based simulation can be an effective approach of testing game 
theoretical arguments and exploring game theoretical ideas.
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conditions, the work incentives of team production can be higher than private pro-
duction (Hamilton et al. 2003; Hansen 1997; Nalbantian and Schotter 1997). However, 
although some successful cases can be found (e.g. Mondragon Corporation in Spain, 
Kibbutz in Israel, Plywood agricultural collective in the U.S.), the policy of agricultural 
collectivization ended up as a failure in most countries (Lin 1993). Studies on the theory 
of team production since the 1970s have indicated the failure is due mainly to free-riding 
among members caused by the weak relationship between their efforts and their rewards 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Meade 1972). Holmstrom (1982) offers a systematic proof 
in terms of the free rider problem which generalises to moral hazard in a multi-agent 
setting. Most economists emphasize the importance of perfect monitoring on the effi-
ciency of team production. It is difficult to generate high levels of efficiency in teams or 
cooperatives with imperfect or costly monitoring.
Monitoring strategies in cooperative teams can be classified as either third party mon‑
itoring or mutual monitoring. Teams which have difficulty being monitored by third par-
ties may be efficient if mutual monitoring can be successfully implemented. The theory 
of self-enforcing agreement studies the efficiency of mutual monitoring in team pro-
duction. An agreement or contract enforced only by two involved parties rather than a 
third party or other voluntary tools can be defined as a self-enforcing agreement. Telser 
(1980) claims parties to an agreement can make it self-enforcing if this is cheaper than 
resorting to a third party, such as the court. A self-enforcing agreement can remain in 
force, provided both parties can be better off by honouring it instead of violating it. In 
a self-enforcing agreement, the only punishment that could be imposed on the violator 
is terminating the agreement. A party will remain faithful to an agreement if the future 
loss caused by ending it is larger than the immediate gain from violating it. Telser (1980) 
surmises a self-enforcing agreement is such that adherence is more advantageous than 
violation satisfies the following conditions: (a) the game between two parties is infinite, 
or the end is uncertain or unknown; (b) the duration of the agreement must be long 
enough; and (c) violations are not expected.
An agreement can be effective only if the threat to punish the violators of the agree-
ment it claims is credible. Macleod (1988) models cooperation in team production as a 
multi-period repeated game and argues that a retaliation strategy can lead to sub-game 
perfect equilibrium if it is credible. The retaliation strategy is that the team members 
can become shirkers themselves if they observe other members shirking. Such mutual 
shirking will lead to losses for every member. Knowing this is going to be the situation, 
nobody will start to shirk. The sufficient conditions under which the retaliation strategy 
works are: (a) the members can keep observing the aggregate output of the team; (b) 
the general possibility that members leave the team is low, i.e., there are restrictions for 
a member to exit the team. Macleod (1988) showed the efficiency of team production 
can be sustained given sufficiently frequent monitoring and low mobility of members. 
Macleod’s model indicates the existence of cooperative equilibrium requires high exit 
costs for the members. Thus only if the exit costs are high enough so that leaving the 
team is impossible, the threat strategy is credible.
Lin (1988, 1990) argues for the free right to exit according to his observations of agri-
cultural cooperative movements in China, which suggests cooperation could be sus-
tained only when household members had the right to leave the team when they had 
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detected shirking members. If exiting the team is not restricted, the hard workers can 
leave the team when they find shirking members. This will lead to a collapse of the coop-
eration, and all members will return to private production, in which case they will all 
lose the economies of scale they could gain from collective production. This threat can 
reduce shirking behaviour and thus guarantee a team to be at least as efficient as the 
private production. Therefore, the free right to exit for each member is an necessity for a 
high-effort equilibrium in cooperative teams (Lin 1993).
Lin’s argument generated a heated debate in the literature. The Journal of Comparative 
Economics held a special symposium over the debate in 1993. Arguments against Lin’s 
(Dong and Dow 1993; Kung 1993; Macleod 1993; Liu 1993; Putterman and Skillman 
1993a) are generally based on Macleod’s model. Notably, Dong and Dow (1993) present 
a model to examine the one-shot effort supply game and its corresponding repeated 
game. Their model demonstrates that mutual shirking imposes a more severe penalty 
than free exit rights, if the members’ payoff from private production is higher than uni-
lateral shirking in a cooperative team, whereas free exit rights could weaken the penalty 
because the shirking members can flee after shirking. In addition, free exit rights can 
even lead to the collapse of an efficient team and the sacrifice of scale economics if mem-
bers use their trigger strategy. Their conclusion is that teams can more readily extract 
effort if they restrict exit when members’ preferences for leisure are not too diverse and 
scale economies are not too extensive. Moreover, if the teams are sufficiently large, the 
exit restrictions yield stronger work incentives than exit rights whenever private produc-
tion is viable. Imposing an exit cost is therefore necessary for the maintenance of any 
self-enforcing agreement, as originally presented in Macleod (1988).
Putterman and Skillman (1993b) try to unify the two arguments. Based on Abreu 
(1988)’s notion of optimal penal codes, their model suggests the scope for effective 
enforcement is directly related to the cost of exit. Macleod’s argument and Lin’s argu-
ment are in fact various extensions of a more general model. They examine two different 
types of team members: Macleod (1988) and Dong and Dow (1993) study the type of 
workers has the incentive to shirk and then quit the cooperative, whereas Lin (1993) dis-
cusses the type of worker may have the incentive to shirk on a continuing basis and stay 
in the cooperative.
In his conclusive comments to the debate, Macleod (1993) points out the debate exists 
because Lin does not provide a formal game theoretical model. The equilibrium of a 
game can typically be explored once the game is well-defined. In addition, the conclusion 
could vary when more complicated issues, for instance, the problem of renegotiation-
proofness, are taken into consideration. Over the past 20 years, much progress has been 
made on developing the original model (for example, Bond 2009; Faillo et al. 2015; Gold-
lücke and Kranz 2013; Miller and Watson 2013; Ray 2002). The two competing argu-
ments have never been formally tested and thus the debate has never been concluded.
The present study will explicitly model the competing arguments using an agent-based 
model approach. This approach enables us to compare the outcomes of the two argu-
ments by modeling all contextual factors and incorporate heterogeneity of households 
that might have a substantial impact on the outcomes (such as their leisure preferences, 
time preferences and marginal products of their effort). This study is an exercise in 
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demonstrating that agent-based simulation can be an effective approach to explore the 
outcomes of game theoretic models.
Methods
Model design
Lin (1993) and Dong and Dow (1993) provide typical elaboration of the two competing 
arguments. The essential hypotheses that the two arguments hold are below:
Hypothesis 1 (Lin 1993) As long as j-type members exist, the free right to exit is a 
necessary condition for high-effort equilibrium, i.e. in the absence of free exit rights, the 
high-effort equilibrium cannot be sustained.
Note: j-type members are those whose utility when they shirk (denoted as unj ) is higher 
than their utility gained from cooperative production (denoted as ucj ), and the utility 
gained from cooperative production is higher than the utility gained from private farm-
ing (denoted as upj ). That is, unj > ucj > u
p
j  holds (Lin 1993; Liu 1993).
Hypothesis 2 (Dong and Dow 1993) Restricting member exit can lead a team to more 
readily extract effort in either of two contexts:
1. Team members’ preferences for leisure are not too diverse and the scale economies 
are not too large.
2. The team is sufficiently large and private production is viable.
To facilitate the comparison, we follow Lin (1990) and Dong and Dow (1993)’s assump-
tions of production function, utility function and their rules of distribution. We also use 
collective farming in production teams in China as the reference to build the model. The 
utility function of a household is
where n is the number of households in a production team. ui, yi, and ei are utility, 
income and effort of household i, respectively. vi(ei) is a function of the disutility of 
household effort. Following Dong and Dow (1993)’s assumption, we assume
where θi indicates Household i’s marginal product of effort, F  is the fixed set-up cost for 
achieving positive output. In order to satisfy v′′i > 0, v′i > 0, and /, vi(0) = 0, we assume
where αi is the marginal rate of the substitution of income and leisure. This value is set to 
be between 0 and 1. Let E =
∑n
k=1 ek to be the total effort and Θ = 1n
∑n
k=1 θk to be the 
average marginal product of effort of a team. The production function of a team is
Outputs are equally distributed among household members in production teams. The 
income of a household is 
ui
(
yi, ei
)
= yi − vi(ei), i = 1 . . . n
yi = θiei − F , ei ≥ F/θi
vi(ei) = αie
2
i
Q = ΘE − F , 0 ≤ E ≤ F/Θ
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which gives 
Since output cannot be negative, it is required that set-up costs are covered i.e. 
E ≥ F/Θ .
For private households, optimal effort is the solution of the function
The optimal effort of private farming is
In collective farming, households can choose to work hard or shirk. Cooperation 
means the team maximizes the total utility of its members:
Since economies of scale do not affect marginal returns to effort, cooperative house-
holds will choose the same effort as those in private farming. The effort vector an effi-
cient team adopts is e∗ =
(
e∗
1
· · · e∗n
)
.
Following Dong and Dow (1993), we assume households in cooperative teams know 
how much effort all other members expended in the previous period, i.e. all the house-
holds detect the presence of shirking in the period after which it occurs. We also assume 
that households use the Grim trigger strategy. That is, a household will implement a 
punishment indefinitely once a household shirks. In this case, the household will not 
cooperate with other households any longer. They will choose an optimal effort given the 
lowest effort level they believe other households will take (zero, in this case).
Non-cooperation means that a household member chooses the optimal effort given 
other households’ efforts. Household i solves the function
As given in Dong and Dow (1993), the solution satisfies the following first-order 
condition
yi =
1
n
[(∑n
k=1 θk
n
n∑
k=1
ek
)
− F
]
,
yi =
ΘE − F
n
,
(
Θ =
1
n
n∑
k=1
θk ,E =
n∑
k=1
ek
)
.
max
ei
[
(θiei − F)− αie
2
i
]
e∗i =
θi
2αi
i = 1 . . . n
max
e1···en
(
θjej − αje
2
j
)
− F .
max
ei



1
n

Θ

ei +�
j �=i
ej

− F



− αie2i

.
θ
n
= v
′
i(e
N
i )
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This is in fact an assumption that ej = 0.
Given ej = 0, the equation becomes max
ei
{[
1
n (Θei − F)
]
− αie
2
i
}
. Solving it out, we 
obtain the optimal effort
All households are in a production team at the initial stage. While being obliged to 
farm independently (i.e., with free rights to exit), they can choose to stay in a production 
team and work hard or shirk, or turn to private farming. If exiting is restricted, they can 
only choose to work hard or shirk.
We assume the households apply the Grim trigger strategy in the repeated game. 
Household i using the Grim trigger acts in the following manner.
1. Work hard by choosing e∗i  in the initial period;
2. Keep working hard if no member shirks by deviating from e∗i (i.e. choosing eNi  in this 
case) or;
3. Start shirking if the payoff of one-period shirking (i.e., shirking once and receiving 
punishment in subsequent periods) is greater than the payoff of keeping working 
hard;
4. Implement punishment in subsequent periods if any member shirks.
The ODD protocol model
Purpose
The purpose of the model is to test which disciplining device is more effective in main-
taining the self-enforcing agreement in cooperative work teams. The model simulates 
two competing disciplining devices, freeing an exit right and imposing an exit cost. Indi-
vidual members in a cooperative team decide to work hard, shirk or exit the team (in the 
case when exit is allowed), reacting to the utilities they obtain under a specific disciplin-
ing device. We use collective farming in agricultural cooperatives in China as the refer-
ence to build the model.
Entities, state variables and scales
There are two types of agent in this model: household and team. Team represents an 
agricultural cooperative, whereas household represents the household members in an 
agricultural cooperative. A team consists of a number of households, as in any agricul-
tural cooperative.
Variables at the household-agent level are listed in Table 1.
Variables associated with the team-agents are listed in Table 2.
Process overview and scheduling
According to two disciplining devices, the model simulates the processes of two sce-
narios: the exit-right scenario and the exit-cost scenario. In both scenarios, households 
choose to work hard initially i.e., using the effort of e∗i . In the iteration periods, if house-
holds observe nobody shirking, they decide whether they are going to shirk by com-
paring the payoff of one-period shirking and the payoff of keeping working hard, i.e., 
eNi =
Θ
2nαi
.
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1
1−δ
uCi . If the latter is larger, they choose to shirk. Otherwise, they keep working hard. 
The payoff of one-period shirking is different in the exit-right and exit-cost scenarios, as 
the punishment following the shirking is different. Specifically, the punishment is private 
working in the exit-right scenario and is non-cooperation in the exit-cost scenarios. The 
payoff of one-period shirking is uSi + δ1−δuPi  in the exit-right, whereas uSi +
δ
1−δ
uNi  in the 
exit-cost scenarios. If households observe a shirking household, those in the exit-right 
scenario can choose whether to shirk themselves or exit the team by comparing the pay-
off of non-cooperation, i.e., uNi , and the payoff of private working, i.e., uPi , whereas those 
Table 1 Household-level variables
a Sustained discount rate is an indicator provided in Dong and Dow (1993). It measure how cooperation is sustained for 
households. It can be used to indicate the sustainability of a team (this is elaborated in the “Results” section)
Variable Data type Value
Shirk status (shirk) Boolean 1 if shirk, 0 otherwise
Exit status (exit) Boolean 1 if shirk, 0 otherwise
Type status (j-type) Boolean 1 if j-type, 0 otherwise
Leisure preference (alpha) Floating-point [0, 1]
Time preference (delta) Floating-point [0, 1]
Marginal product of effort (theta) Integer [1, 10]
Fixed cost (fixcost) Integer [5, 30]
Working effort (effort) Floating-point Model output
Output yield by production (yield) Floating-point Model output
Utility (utility) Floating-point Model output
Sustained discount rate (discounta) Floating-point Model output
Table 2 Attribute of the team agent
Variable Data type Value
Population (population) Integer [10, 100]
Threshold to dismiss a team (dismiss-rate) Floating-point [0.4, 0.8]
Number of shirked households (shirk-num) Floating-point Model output
Number of exited households (exit-num) Floating-point Model output
Average sustained discount rate (ave-discount) Floating-point Model output
Fig. 1 Households’ decision making process in exit-right scenario
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in the exit-cost scenario can only choose to follow suit. In each simulation, the whole 
process repeats for ten times (by which over 90 % of the cases have converged, according 
to our experimental running) or until the team is dismissed (in the exit-right scenario).
Figures  1 and 2 illustrate the processes in the exit-right and exit-cost scenario, 
respectively.
Design concepts
Emergence For the purposes of evaluating which disciplining device is more effective, 
we explore the average sustained discount rates (which indicate the sustainability of a 
team that a disciplining device leads to), the average effort and the average utility (which 
together indicate the outcome of a disciplining device) of households in a team. They are 
emergent in the sense that they are the results of the decentralised decisions of house-
holds.
Adaptation (how the agents adapt their behaviour to their and their environments current 
state) In each round, households update their decisions, to keep working hard, to shirk 
or to exit the team (in the exit-right scenario) according to their payoff as a result of the 
decision of their fellow households.
Objectives Households aim to maximize the current utility they obtain and the dis-
counted future utility they could obtain when they make decisions.
Prediction Agents in the model generally do not predict. Households, however, are able 
to calculate their future utility by assuming that their fellows will keep working hard if 
they observe nobody shirking and assuming that their fellow households will adopt the 
Grim trigger strategy when they shirk.
Sensing Households are assumed to know all other households’ decisions in the last 
period, but not in the present period.
Stochasticity The model deliberately avoids introducing stochasticity, as it was designed 
to extend other deterministic models. The only potential source of stochasticity is house-
holds’ time preference, leisure preference, marginal product of effect and fixed cost, 
which are generated based on different distributions (normal, Poisson or exponential dis-
tribution).
Fig. 2 Households’ decision making process in exit-cost scenario
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Observation (how data are gathered from  the model) Various observations are avail-
able to produce by the model, from an omniscient perspective, as it were. However, the 
key observations we are interested are the effort that households make, the utility they 
gain, and their sustained discount rate. The rate of households who exit the team is also 
observed in the exit-right scenario.
Initialization
The state of the model is initialised by setting an initial configuration of agent attributes. 
All household agents are initialized as being in a cooperative (exit status) and working 
hard (shirk status). The initial values of households’ leisure preference, time preference, 
marginal product of effect and fixed cost are chosen arbitrarily, with several runs used to 
determine the typical behaviour of the model using a statistical test (shown in Table 3). 
Whether a household is of j-type is determined once its marginal product of effort 
(theta) and the fixed cost (fixcost) are determined.
Input
Following the initialisation, household conditions remain constant over and time in the 
model. There are two scenarios, in which households are allowed to exit their teams or 
not. In the exit-right scenario, households are allowed to exit from the team when pri-
vate working is more beneficial for them. In the exit-cost scenario, households are not 
allowed to exit under any circumstances.
Sub‑models
Households choose their effort to optimize their utilities in four cases: private work-
ing, cooperation, non-cooperation, unilateral shirking (given all households using Grim 
strategy). The optimal efforts in the four cases are calculated as below.
Private farming 
Solving the FOC yields:
uPi
(
e∗i
)
=
(
θi
θi
2αi
− F
)
− αi
(
θi
2αi
)2
uPi
(
e∗i
)
=
θ2i
4αi
− F .
Table 3 Household-level variables
a It means incrementing from 0 to 1, with the interval of 0.1. Similarly, hereinafter
Variable Initial value
Leisure preference (alpha) [0:0.1:1]a
Time preference (delta) [0:0.1:1]
Marginal product of effort (theta) [1:1:10]
Fixed cost (fixcost) [5:5:30]
Population (population) [10:10:100]
Threshold to dismiss a team (dismiss-rate) [0.4:0.2:0.8]
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Cooperation in collective farming 
Solving the FOC yields:
Non‑cooperation in collective farming 
Solving the FOC yields:
Unilateral shirking (trigger strategy) 
Solving the FOC yields:
Results
The simulation was repeated 1000 times for each parameter combination. We use the 
mean over the 1000 repetitions as the value of each variable in our simulations.
Outcomes of the two disciplining devices
Different disciplining devices provide different motivations to individual households, 
and thus leads them to devote different amounts of effort. Accordingly, households 
obtain different amounts of utility. In order to test how disciplining device affects the 
outcome of a team in terms of the average effort that households make and the average 
utility that households obtain, we run regressions over the simulation results using the 
Eqs.  (1) and (2) below. Equation  (1) reflects the correlation between household effort 
(effort) and leisure preference (alpha), time preference (delta), marginal product of effort 
(theta), and fixed cost (fixcost), whereas Eq. (2) reflects the correlation between house-
hold utility (utility) and household effort (effort).
uCi
(
e∗i
)
=
1
n
[
Θ
(
θ1
2α1
+ · · · +
θi
2αi
+ · · · +
θn
2αn
)
− F
]
− αi
(
θi
2αi
)2
uCi
(
e∗i
)
=
Θ
2n
(
θ1
α1
+ · · · +
θi
αi
+ · · · +
θn
αn
)
−
θ2i
4αi
−
F
n
.
uNi
(
eNi
)
=
1
n
[
Θ
(
Θ
2nα1
+ · · · +
Θ
2nαi
+ · · · +
Θ
2nαn
)
− F
]
− αi
(
Θ
2nαi
)2
uNi
(
eNi
)
=
Θ2
2n2
(
1
α1
+ cdots +
1
αi−1
+
1
αi+1
+ · · · +
1
αn
)
+
Θ2
4n2αi
−
F
n
.
uSi
(
eNi , e
∗
−i
)
=
1
n
[
Θ
(
θ1
2α1
+ · · · +
Θ
2nαi
+ · · · +
θn
2αn
)
− F
]
− αi
(
Θ
2nαi
)2
uSi
(
eNi , e
∗
−i
)
=
Θ
2n
(
θ1
α1
+ · · · +
θi−1
αi−1
+
θi+1
αi+1
+ · · · +
θn
αn
)
+
Θ2
4n2αi
−
F
n
.
(1)effortk = ω1alphak + ω2thetak + ω3deltak + ω4fixcostk + ε
(2)utilityk = ω1effortk + ε
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Figures  3 and 4 compare the average effort members input and the average utility 
members obtain under different levels of the marginal product (theta) in the two sce-
narios. Both the values of all households and those who stay in teams are calculated to 
observe the effect of free exit.
Figure 3 shows the average effort of all households is distinctly higher in the exit-right 
scenario than in the exit-cost scenario, while the contrary is the case for households in 
teams. This difference increases as the value of theta grows. The average utility of all 
households is generally close in the two scenarios. The average utility of households in 
teams is distinctly higher in the exit-cost scenario. As theta grows, in the exit-cost sce-
nario, the average utility of all households increases more rapidly, whereas the average 
utility of households staying in teams decreases more rapidly.
These results are probably related to the change of the exit rate and the economies of 
scale. In the exit-right scenario, the exit rate increases as households’ marginal products 
of effort increase, i.e., households have a high ability to produce. Therefore, the average 
effort over all households increases, while that of the households in teams decreases as 
theta grows.
A similar pattern is found for average utility. In the exit-cost scenario, the average 
effort of all households and those remaining in teams decrease as theta grows, due to 
the increase of the rate of shirking households (i.e., shirking rate). The corresponding 
Fig. 3 The average effort (top side) and the utility (bottom side) of all the households (left side) and those 
staying in teams (right side) over the marginal product of effort (theta) in the exit-right (black line) and the 
exit-cost (red line) scenario
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average utility, however, keeps growing and becomes higher in the exit-cost scenario, 
due to the existence of economies of scale.
Figure 4 indicates quite a similar landscape of comparing results in the two scenarios 
to Fig. 3. It is worth noting that, as the fixed cost grows, the average utility of all house-
hold decreases in the exit-right scenario but increases in the exit-cost scenario. This sug-
gests the exit-cost device outperforms the exit-right in the case of a high economics of 
scale. However, this could be changed if we take transaction costs, which may increase 
while the economics of scale grow, into consideration.
In general, the average effort of all households is much higher in the exit-right sce-
nario, whereas the average utility of all households is close in the two scenarios. The 
average effort and the average utility of households in teams are both higher when exit 
is restricted. It implies effort levels and utilities of the leaving households are quite high. 
The difference of the effort level and utility in the exit-free team is obviously higher than 
in the exit-restricted teams. It also suggests the exit-restricted teams could behave better 
in limiting the income disparity among members, which provide an explanation to the 
situation in Chinese agricultural cooperatives in the 1960s and 1970s.
Factors affecting exit rate
The above section suggests that production ability and economics of scale both influence 
the exit rate (rate of households that exit a team). To check if the two variables have a 
Fig. 4 The average effort (top side) and the utility (bottom side) of all the households (left side) and those 
staying in teams (right side) over the fixed cost (fixcost) in the exit-right (black line) and the exit-cost (red line) 
scenario
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crossing effect on the exit rate, we first draw a heatmap of the exit rate over the marginal 
product and the fixed cost (shown in Fig. 5). We find no evidence for the crossing effect 
from the heatmap because the two colours are not mixed.
Next, we examine the effect of each of them separately. Figure  6a demonstrates the 
correlation between the exit rate and theta. It shows these two variables are obviously 
positively correlated, which basically verifies our inference. Meanwhile, Fig. 6b illustrates 
Fig. 5 Heatmap of exit rate over the marginal product of effort (theta) and the fixed cost (fixcost)
Fig. 6 a Relationship between exit rate and the marginal product of effort (theta); b Relationship between 
exit rate and the fixed cost (fixcost)
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the correlation between exit rate and the fixed cost. The graph also shows an obvious 
negative correlation, which suggests that the higher the economics of scale that house-
hold members can obtain, the less intended they exit.
Necessity of exit‑right disciplining device
According to Lin (1993), the existence of j-type households is essential to the debate 
over the exit-right and the exit-cost disciplining devices. For a j-type household, 
uNj > u
C
j > u
P
j  establishes. A j-type household with a high preference for leisure has an 
incentive to shirk and stay within the cooperative. If j-type households exist in a cooper-
ative, which Lin believes this is for sure for a 100-farmer team, his argument of exit right 
will be valid, otherwise, Dong and Dow’s argument of exit right will be valid.
We first examine what factor(s) affect the existence of j-type households and under 
what condition(s) they exists. Holding other variables, we run the model to test if the 
gradual changes of marginal product of effort (theta), fixed cost (fixcost), preference for 
leisure (alpha), preference for future income (delta) and their combinations change the 
number of j-type households. By running the model for 100 times over each combina-
tion, we find that only the marginal product of effort (theta) and fixed cost (fixcost) affect 
the existence of j-type households (see Table 4) and the number of them, and whether 
the exit is free or restricted in the teams makes no difference. According to the result, we 
believe that j-type households do exist in the teams in our model.
It shows j-type households certainly exist when the marginal product of effort (theta) 
is very low (2 and lower in this case). As the value of theta increases, j-type households 
exist only when fixed cost (fixcost) is high. No j-type household is found when theta is 
high (>6 in this case). If taking the number of j-type household in a team within a par-
ticular population into consideration (which we do show in this table for simplicity but 
quite apparent), it grows as theta decreases and fixcost increases. We, therefore, con-
clude that the possibility of the existence of j-type household is negatively correlated to 
the marginal product of effort and positively correlated to fixed cost (which represents 
economies of scale).
This can be explained by (a) the lower the marginal product of households (the abil-
ity to produce independently), the higher their willingness to stay in teams; and (b) the 
higher the economies of scale of a team, the more households can be benefited by stay-
ing in the team, which enhance their willingness to stay. This accords with the model’s 
inputs and, helpfully, with common sense.
Next, we test Lin’s argument that free exit right works better than restrictive exit right 
if households have incentive to shirk and stay (which are j-type households with high 
Table 4 Existence of j-type household
theta is set to increases from 2 to 10 in intervals of 2. fixcost is set to increase from 6 to 20 in intervals of 2
theta fixcost
2 6–20
4 12–20
6 16–20
Page 15 of 19Xiong et al. Complex Adapt Syst Model  (2016) 4:21 
preference for leisure) exist in teams. Based on the above settings where j-type house-
holds exist, we let preference of leisure (alpha) change from 0.1 to 1 in intervals of 0.1. 
We use the sustained discount rate δ¯ developed in Dong and Dow (1993) to evaluate 
which strategy, the exit-right or the exit-cost, play as a better disciplining device. We 
have:
where u¯i = uPi  if in exit-right scenario, and u¯i = uNi  in exit-cost scenario. A larger value 
of δ¯ indicates a weaker deterrent effect of the penalty phase because worker i must value 
the future payoff more highly in order to dissuaded from shirking.
Hypothesis 1 (Lin 1993) concerns the necessity of exit rights for high-effort equilib-
rium in cooperatives. To test this hypothesis, we test if the sustained discount rate δ¯ is 
lower when exit is free than restricted under the circumstance where j-type households 
exit. Thus, the following equation is estimated.
where δ¯k is the average effort of production team (i.e. running round in this case) k, and 
Ik is an indicator variable which equals 1 when exit is free and 0 otherwise. To demon-
strate the difference that might be caused by different distributions of leisure preference, 
the coefficient of Ik , β , is estimated for the normal, Poisson and the exponential distribu-
tions. Table 5 presents the results.
It shows that Ik is significant in all the cases. Moreover, its coefficient is negative. This 
indicates that the sustained discount rate δ¯ is lower in teams with exit rights than teams 
with exit costs. This result verifies Hypothesis 1.
Sustainability of exit‑cost versus exit‑right disciplining device
Hypothesis 2 (Dong and Dow 1993) proposes two independent sufficient conditions 
under which restricted exit provides lower sustained discount rate δ¯. We shall refer to 
them as Claim (i) and (ii) respectively hereafter. Claim (i) is related to the diversity of 
households’ leisure preference and scale economies. The diversity of leisure preference 
is measured by standard deviation of leisure preference (alpha-sd), and scale economies 
are indicated by the fixed cost (fixcost). To test Claim (i), we estimate the same function 
as above over different fixed cost and standard deviation of leisure preference respec-
tively. As standard deviations are not available for Poisson and exponential distribu-
tions, we only test the standard deviation of leisure preference for the case of the normal 
distribution.
δ¯ =
uSi − u
C
i
uSi − u¯i
δ¯k = βIk + ε
Table 5 Estimated effect of exit rights on sustained discount rate for testing Hypothesis 1
*, ** and *** denote significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively
Distribution Normal Poisson Exponential
Estimate of β −0.2216*** (−93.37) −0.3888*** (−34.15) −0.3878** (−48.05)
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Figure 7a shows the coefficient generally decreases as fixed cost grows. In the section 
where fixed cost is less than a certain level (somewhere between 30 and 40 in this case), 
the coefficient is positive, which indicates the sustained discount rate δ¯ is lower in coop-
eratives without exit rights. Figure  7b shows a generally negative correlation between 
the coefficient and standard deviation of alpha. A threshold of fixed cost can be found at 
somewhere between 0.30 and 0.40. When fixed cost is less than such threshold, the coef-
ficient is positive, which indicates the sustained discount rate δ¯ is lower in cooperatives 
without exit rights.
Claim (ii) is related to the team size. We estimate coefficients of sustained discount 
rate over the number of household in cooperatives in difference distributions. The three 
plots in Fig. 8 display coefficients of sustained discount rate over the team size for differ-
ent distributions.
All plots show positive correlations between the coefficient and team scale. As the 
team size exceeds a certain boundary value, the coefficient changes from negative to 
positive. This suggests the sustained discount rate δ¯ is lower in cooperatives without exit 
rights than those with exit rights when the team size is sufficiently large.
Therefore, both the two claims of Hypothesis 2 are verified by the statistical analysis of 
our simulation outcomes.
Fig. 7 a Coefficients of sustained discount rate versus fixed cost; b coefficients of sustained discount rate 
versus standard deviation of alpha
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Conclusion
This study tests two competing arguments in the theories of self-enforcing agreement 
using agent-based modelling. These arguments were original proposed verbally or as a 
game theoretical model, and have never been tested in a same framework. Our model 
explicitly considers the size of the cooperative team in question and the heterogeneity of 
the members in the team, including their leisure preference (i.e., laziness), time prefer-
ence (i.e., patience to future well-being) and the marginal product of effort (i.e., work 
ability). This allows us to better understand the divergence of these two arguments. Sta-
tistical analysis over the simulated data shows: (1) the sustained discount rate is lower in 
exit-free cooperative teams than exit-restricted ones when shirking members exist. This 
confirms the hypothesis based on the argument of Lin (1993). (2) The sustained discount 
rate is lower in exit-restricted teams than exit-free ones when members’ leisure prefer-
ences are not too diverse, and the economics of scale are not too large. A threshold of 
standard deviation of the leisure preference and the fixed cost are found in our results. 
This is consistent with Claim (i) of the hypothesis developed based on the argument of 
Dong and Dow (1993). (3) The sustained discount rate is lower in exit-restricted teams 
than exit-free ones when the sizes of the teams are large enough. This result verifies 
Claim (ii) developed based on the argument of the hypothesis of Dong and Dow (1993).
In fact, the two hypotheses argue different consequences under different conditions, 
and thus suggest different policies for different conditions of members’ characteristics 
in a cooperative team. If there are members whose production is very low when working 
privately (such as those who are extremely lazy or with very low work ability), giving the 
members a free right to exit can more readily extract the team’s maximum effort. How-
ever, in the situation that most members work reasonably hard and can do quite well 
when working privately, restricting exit would be a better disciplining device.
Fig. 8 a–c Coefficients of sustained discount rate versus team size for normal, Poisson and exponential 
distribution, respectively
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This study is a useful exercise showing how agent-based simulation explores insights 
that game theory approach may find difficulty to achieve. Compared to game theoreti-
cal model, agent-based model can incorporate the heterogeneity of individuals more 
effectively. This often allows researcher to delve into a lower level of the question in dis-
cussion and thus reach more insightful conclusion, especially in the cases where hetero-
geneity of individuals could impose a significant impact on the result.
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